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Abstract 
After nearly fifty years of stability and stagnation of dairy market regulations in 
Israel, a dramatic policy reform has been enacted in 1999. The reform enabled farm 
households, for the first time, to trade production quotas. In addition, the reform 
signaled to farmers that milk prices will gradually go down in real terms, and 
therefore only producers who expand and become more efficient will prevail. The 
reform allowed for generous financial support for investment in expansion, but also 
required the adoption of environmental regulations which could be costly to many 
farm families. This paper uses data from a census of small family-operated dairy 
enterprises that was conducted in 2001, in order to analyze the response of farm 
households to the reform. The results imply that the reform was particularly attractive 
for already strong producers. Weaker producers are less attracted by the reform and 
will likely fade away by default in the long run. Another finding is that 
intergenerational succession is an important element of decision making of milk 
producers. Hence, the response of farm households to changes in the economic 
environment cannot be disentangled from the occupational decisions of their 
offspring. These findings imply that the desired structural change in the family-farm 
milk production sector will take much longer than expected, essentially as long as the 
current generation of producers is around. This requires, perhaps, an extension of the 
reform period or a change in incentives in favor of the smaller and older producers. 
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Introduction  
Dairy farming has been one of the most stable and profitable farm activities in 
Israel over the years. It accounted for 13% of total farm output in the year 2000. The 
dairy branch is regulated using production quotas and protected from imports. Central 
planning is justified by specific attributes of milk as a fresh product and of the 
production process, and also by the role of the agricultural sector as a whole in 
achieving national goals such as populating remote areas. In recent years, milk 
producers are facing two economic threats: opening markets for cheap milk products 
due to international trade agreements, and enforcement of environmental regulations. 
In order to prepare for these threats, a market reform program has been launched at 
the end of 1998. The purpose of the reform was to provide incentives for producers to 
increase their cost efficiency, especially through increasing the volume of production. 
A secondary purpose is to help producers meet environmental standards.  
 The specific ingredients of the reform are: (a) allowing for the trade of 
production quotas between existing producers, thereby encouraging inefficient 
producers to quit and efficient producers to expand, and the creation of partnerships 
among existing producers; (b) subsidizing investments in farm infrastructure that are 
necessary to increase production capacity and meet environmental regulations; and (c) 
gradual reduction in the price of milk at the farm gate. It was expected that the price 
reduction will force milk producers to either quit or expand and become more cost 
efficient. 
 Milk production in Israel is divided between collective farms (Kibbutz), which 
include less than 20% of dairy farms but produce more than 50% of milk, and family 
farms. Dairy farms in the collective farm sector are large, modern, and relatively 
efficient, while the family farm sector includes a variety of milk producers, the 
minority of which are large and modern (especially partnerships of several producers), 
but most of them are small and less efficient. Since the launch of the dairy market 
reform in 1998 and until the year 2001, 18% of dairy farms in the collective farm 
sector started to form joint ventures. Few producers in the family farm sector have 
started joint ventures, but more of them took at least first steps towards increasing 
production, while other producers quit. Farm size seems to be a major determinant of 
dairy producers’ response to the reform: while the larger producers tend to expand 
production, the small producers, the elderly, and those without a successor are more 
likely to quit. A dairy farm census conducted in early 2001 found that about two 
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thirds of active producers definitely want to stay in the business in the post-reform 
era, and the majority of those are relatively large producers. Less than half of the 
active producers have taken any step towards this goal, though. As opposed to the 
collective farm sector, many family farms are still undecided. The question is whether 
the reform is indeed suitable to the needs and constraints of small producers, and 
whether it is possible to gain knowledge about those needs and constraints using data 
on the progress of the implementation of the reform. 
 The purpose of this paper is to analyze the decisions of family-farm milk 
producers to join the reform and to take adequate actions. In particular, we will 
analyze the intentions and actions of farmers with respect to the reform: whether they 
are committed to continue production and have taken some action towards that, or 
have decided to quit or are still weighing their response. The results could be used to 
predict the future path of the reform in terms of producers’ participation, and to assess 
the eventual structure of the sector at the end of the adjustment process.  
 In the next section we provide some background on dairy market policies and 
review the relevant literature. After that we describe the data set used in this research. 
Then we describe the empirical methodology and present the results. The last section 
offers several policy implications and concluding comments. 
 
Background and literature review 
 The necessity for a policy reform in the dairy farm in Israel was not due to 
local economic circumstances, but to global trends and forces which signaled a future 
impact on world wide dairy markets. For the first time Agreement On Agriculture 
(AOA) was reached as part of the Uruguay round of World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1994. Aspiring to liberalize world trade and contribute to economic growth 
and development, the participants signed an accord which consisted of three elements; 
reducing domestic support to agriculture, increasing market access to foreign supply 
and reducing export subsidies. 
 With neither immediate nor extreme impact of the AOA on agricultural 
markets, Jesse (2003) argues that the contribution of that agreement is by establishing 
guidelines, rules and protocols for further negotiations for liberalized agricultural 
trade. Although the AOA did not yield direct or significant change in international 
agricultural trade, we claim here that the AOA and the decision of setting the talks to 
be resumed in the year 2000 were signals for countries with high cost of production, 
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large scale of border protection and trade barriers to initiate policies towards the 
"cloudy days" of liberal trade. 
 While the reform in Israel is one example to support our claim, Schluep 
Campo and Beghin (2006) present a comprehensive study of the dairy market in 
Japan, one that may reinforce our claim as well. The Japanese producers face 
challenges similar to these of the Israeli family farm dairy producers: aging and 
shrinking number of farmers which are threatened by environmental regulations. The 
Japanese dairy market is protected by high tariffs and transportation costs which 
isolate it from the efficient producers in its region (e.g New Zealand and Australia). 
Before the AOA and until 1996, production was governed by quotas which could not 
have been traded. A reform that was launched in 1996 reversed that policy and 
effectively generated a market for quotas. In addition, a price support program granted 
deficiency payments and subsidies for determined production quotas. This program 
resulted in a fluid milk price decline. The reduction in price and the fact that Japan 
fulfilled its modest commitment of the AOA did not promote a significant change of 
trade patterns in the region (Peng and Cox 2006; Beghin 2006).  
 Another Asian country that was isolated from dairy world market until signing 
the AOA is Korea. The policy of strict direct control of milk imports was replaced by 
high tariffs and tight tariff rate quotas. The government, via an industry "Dairy 
Committee," sets the price of raw milk to be higher than the average production cost 
to support domestic farmers. Although cost has been declining due to technological 
improvements over the years, the price of milk at the farm gate remained fixed. This 
has recently led to some policy adjustments in order to allow consumers to enjoy the 
reduced production costs, and more policy changes are expected in the near future 
(Song and Sumner 1999; Lee et al. 2006).       
 The Doha round of the WTO negotiations began in November 2001 and has 
not been concluded by its recent meeting in July 2006. Talks have been suppressed 
constantly over a disagreement between the European Union and the United States 
and many of the developing countries (G20 group). Though not motivated by the 
same interests, the development countries complained about lack of market access in 
high income countries and farm subsidies (Fabiosa et al. 2005). 
 Since 2001, the ongoing negotiations stimulated researchers to study and 
explore the variety of scenarios and their outcomes on international dairy markets. To 
give a few recent examples, Dobson (2005) discusses the implications of the Doha 
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negotiations for the U.S dairy industry, Fabiosa et al. (2005) investigate the impacts of 
multilateral removal of all border taxes and farm programs and their distortions on 
developing economies, Fuller et al. (2006) study the potential of export growth of 
dairy farms in Argentina and Chile, Lee et al. (2006) consider the impact of reduced 
import barriers in Korea, while Peng and Cox (2006) explore the scenario of further 
trade liberalization of Asian dairy markets. All of the above and many more economic 
studies of future policy and trade have been based on readily available aggregate data. 
 The outcome of a policy reform in Connecticut is analyzed by Foltz (2003) 
using micro level farm data. A price support program was tested as a way of keeping 
dairy farms in business. In this economic environment farms are profitable and the 
regulator is not driven by future liberalized trade, but rather by high opportunity cost 
of land and labor. The findings are that (1) unemployment (lending) rate has a 
positive (negative) impact on staying in business, and that (2) farm size does not 
affect the exit decision directly but productivity per cow does. Foltz (2003) concludes 
by claiming that "price policy alone will not maintain dairy farming in an increasingly 
suburban state such as Connecticut". 
 The dairy reform in Israel is not a price support policy; on the contrary, farm 
investments are subsidized initially and the price of raw milk declines from that point 
forward in order to prepare for accommodating freer trade with competitive markets.  
This kind of reform has not been analyzed previously in the economic literature. 
However, it can be thought of as a special case of technology adoption. The literature 
on technology adoption deals with new crop varieties (Lin 1991), improved 
cultivation techniques (Lee and Stewart 1983; Harper et al. 1990; Caswell 1991; 
Khanna 2001) , and water pollution prevention technologies (Cooper and Keim 
1996). Often these are technologies that could be adopted parallel to existing 
technologies, and in such a case the question is not only whether to adopt but also 
how much to adopt (Just and Zilberman 1983; Lin 1991). Several authors dealt with 
adopting a bundle of technologies. Some of them analyze the decision to adopt one 
technology out of the bundle or the bundle as a whole (Feder 1982; Wozniak 1984; 
Dorfman 1996), while other describe a gradual adoption of technology components 
that are not independent of each other (Byerlee and Hesse de Polanco 1986; Leathers 
and Smale 1991; Khanna 2001). 
 The dairy market reform in Israel can be described as a new technology that 
becomes available but requires substantial investments and leads to uncertain profits. 
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In addition, the reform has several components that are conditional upon each other: it 
is impossible to invest in increased production capacity without investing in 
environmental preservation, but it is possible to invest in environmental preservation 
without increasing capacity. In this sense, the model of Isik and Khanna (2002) is 
appropriate. Adopting the reform can also be thought of as a diffusion process 
(Griliches 1957; Knudston 1991; Fernandez-Cornejo, Alexander and Goodhue 2002). 
Kislev and Shchori-Bachrach (1973) show that the diffusion process can be reversed 
after it reaches a peak, because changes in market conditions may cause early 
adopters to quit. Few articles have been written on technology adoption in dairy 
farms, especially on adopting a growth hormone. Saha, Love and Schwart (1994) look 
at the decision on how many cows to treat with the hormone conditional on the 
decision to use the hormone in general, while Barham, Jackson-Smith and Moon 
(2000) deal with the binary decision to use the hormone that is made jointly with the 
decision to continue in milk production, which seems to be relevant to our case. 
   
Data and descriptive statistics 
 The main source of data for this research is a census of family-farm milk 
producers that was conducted between December 2000 and April 2001, on behalf of 
the Israeli Dairy Board. 95% of producers were included, for a total of 1,251 farms. 
The data included several types of information: (a) producer’s profile, including age, 
education, secondary employment, existing of a successor, household size; (b) dairy 
farm characteristics, including location, production quota, number of cows, calves, 
etc., partnership status, physical condition, years since last investment, number of 
milking per day, hired labor, profitability; (c) village attributes, including the 
existence of cooperation among producers, the existence of a central sewer system, 
and the existence of a cow feed enterprise; and (d) attitudes towards the reform, 
including whether the farmer plans to remain in business, investments made towards 
this aim, reasons for not deciding, reasons for deciding to quit. 
 Additional data was provided by the Israeli Dairy Board for the years 1996-
2001, including details on production quotas, new partnership formation, and buying 
and selling of production quotas. We also obtained, from the Dairy Herd Book 
prepared by the Israeli Cattle Breeders association, data on milk quality at the farm 
level.  
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 The data show that roughly two thirds of milk producers in the family-farm 
sector plan to remain in business in the post-reform era. Only 7% of the producers 
plan to quit. The remaining producers are undecided. 87% of producers who plan to 
stay in business already made some investments. More than half of those who made 
investments invested both in production capacity and towards environmental 
preservation. It should be noted that one of the requirements of the reform is that each 
producer will reach a level of production of at least 600,000 liters. As can be seen in 
figure 1, before the reform was launched only about 10% of producers in the family-
farm sector satisfied this requirement. Hence, it is clear that the other producers will 
have to make a choice sooner or later, otherwise they will simply fade away by 
default. 
 The description of the explanatory variables will be facilitated by looking at 
their descriptive statistics in table 1. Missing values in various variables limit the 
sample size to 891 observations. Missing values in the milk components and quality 
variables limit the sample size further to 616 observations. This is because these data 
came from a different source, as explained above. In table 1, we present the 
descriptive statistics of the full sample and the limited sample. The variables of age, 
professional training and additional employment refer to the farm operator. A farm 
with a potential successor means that a successor exists but has not made a final 
decision to become a successor (which is a formality in Israeli cooperative villages 
(Moshav). Production is measured in units of 100,000 liters. Production data was 
missing for 17% of the farms; hence we set their production level to zero and included 
a dummy indicator for these farms. 11% of producers are not producing on their own 
but rather rent out their quotas. Hence we included the dummy indicator of self-
producing. The percentages of milk components (protein and fat) are distributed over 
a rather narrow range. The range of Somatic Cell Count (SCC) is relatively more 
dispersed. Lower values of SCC indicate higher milk quality and are also correlated 
with higher milk production per cow. Both milk components and SCC affect the price 
of milk obtained by the producer. The average milk producer has made his last capital 
investment more than five years prior to the survey. 53% of producers reside in 
villages in which the cooperative society is still functioning. 20% of producers take 
part in some sort of producer cooperation. 41% of producers have access to a feed 
enterprise in the immediate locality, and 79% of them have access to a central sewer 
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system. 65% of producers have already made up their mind to adopt the reform. The 
remaining 35% are mostly undecided. 
 
Empirical analysis 
 In order to analyze the binary decision to adopt the reform, we use the Probit 
maximum likelihood procedure. This procedure assumes that there exists a continuous 
latent variable of the tendency to adopt the reform, and that the observed binary 
variable of adoption indicates that the tendency to adopt crossed some unknown 
threshold. This latent variable is specified as a linear function of explanatory 
variables. The procedure provides estimates of the coefficients of that function. Using 
the estimated coefficients, it is possible to compute marginal effects of each 
explanatory variable on the probability to adopt the reform. In the case of continuous 
explanatory variables, the marginal effect relates to a change of one unit in the 
variable. For the binary explanatory variables, the marginal effect is the difference in 
probabilities between setting the explanatory variable to one and setting it to zero, 
given that all other explanatory variables are set at their sample means. 
 We estimate the model using the full sample and the limited sample, including 
the milk quality indicators, alternatively. This allows us to assess the importance of 
milk quality and also to verify that other effects, that are consistent across the two 
versions, are not subject to serious sample selectivity bias. The results of the full 
sample and the limited sample are in table 2 and 3, respectively. Beginning with the 
full sample results in table 2, we find that age has a statistically significant negative 
effect on the adoption probability. The existence of a successor is another 
quantitatively important explanatory variable. These two results jointly indicate that 
the most important determinant of the adoption decision is the planning horizon. A 
simple computation shows that a 45-year old farmer with a succeeding child is 40% 
more likely to adopt the reform than a 60-year old farmer without a succeeding child. 
Another important result is that larger producers are more likely to adopt the reform. 
This could be because they are more profitable or because they simply need smaller 
investments in order to satisfy the minimum threshold production required by the 
reform. However, the significant effect of size vanished after adding milk quality 
indicators as explanatory variables (table 3). To the extent that higher milk quality is 
associated with higher profitability and efficiency, we conclude that required 
investments were not the cause for the size effect on the adoption decision.  
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 We also find that milk producers that are already taking part in a partnership 
are more likely to adopt the reform. This makes much sense because the combined 
production of the partnership is probably larger than that of a single producer and 
hence the required investment in production capacity is smaller. Years since last 
investment decrease the probability of adopting the reform. This could be due to two 
reasons. First, the required investments may be higher for farms who have not 
invested for a longer period. Second, lack of recent investment may indicate a long-
run tendency not to continue in milk production, for various reasons that are not 
captured by the other explanatory variables. Being a part of a producers’ cooperation 
also increases the probability of adopting the reform. This result is reasonable, 
provided that such cooperation is likely to enhance efficiency of production. Finally, 
farms in the southern part of the country are least likely to adopt the reform. This 
result is disturbing, since from the point of view of environmental regulations, 
southern farmers have an advantage in the sense that their required investment in this 
direction is likely to be lower. This implies that farmers in the south are 
disadvantaged in other dimensions relative to farmers in the rest of the country. Note, 
however, that the coefficient of the southern location becomes insignificant in the 
limited sample (table 3). 
 The quality of milk has a positive effect on the decision to adopt the reform, 
reflected in a positive effect of fat contents and a negative effect of SCC (table 3). The 
effect of protein contents is negative, which is counterintuitive, but is not significantly 
different from zero. A number of differences exist between the results of the full 
sample (table 2) and the limited sample (table 3). First, the positive effect of a 
potential rather than a definite successor becomes statistically insignificant in the 
limited sample. Second, as mentioned above, the effect of production also becomes 
insignificant in the limited sample. This could be either because production captures 
the effect of milk quality in the full sample, or because reporting milk quality is 
correlated with production, resulting in selectivity bias. Third, the negative effect of a 
cooperative society (as opposed to a producers’ cooperation) becomes statistically 
significant in the limited sample. We cannot think of a theoretical justification for this 
effect other than selectivity bias.  
 Next, we want to examine whether the implementation of the reform reveals 
any information on top of the decision to adopt. Figure 2 shows that among the 65% 
of milk producers that decided to adopt the reform, 8% have not taken any action 
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towards this goal, 24% started investing in one of the two required channels 
(production capacity and environmental protection), and 33% started investing in both 
channels. The model we chose for this analysis is the Ordered Probit maximum 
likelihood model. This is similar in principle to the Binary Probit model, the 
difference being that the range of the latent continuous variable is divided into a 
number of sub-ranges that is equal to the number of categories (four in our case). The 
model provides estimates of the three thresholds that define the four ranges, in 
addition to the coefficient estimates. 
 The Ordered Probit results are in tables 4 and 5, for the full sample and the 
limited sample, respectively. The results are qualitatively very similar to the Binary 
Probit results, indicating that implementation of the reform does not reveal much 
additional information on top of the information on the decision to adopt the reform. 
One difference that is worth mentioning is that the coefficient of years since last 
investment, which was only marginally significant in the Binary Probit model, is more 
significant in the Ordered Probit model. Note that the threshold estimates in the 
limited sample estimation (table 5) are not statistically different from zero. This 
means, in principle, that we are not able to distinguish between the sub-ranges of the 
latent adoption variable using the limited sample. We re-estimated the model using 
the limited sample and excluding the milk quality variables, and obtained significant 
thresholds. This indicates that it is not the loss of observations but rather the inclusion 
of the quality variables that causes the insignificant thresholds. Overall, the Ordered 
Probit results do not reveal any new insight that justified a more thorough 
examination of the differences between the full sample and the limited sample in this 
case. 
 
Conclusions 
We conclude that farm households responded to the initiation of the dairy 
policy reform in a way that is consistent with existing theories of technology 
adoption. In particular, they respond to economic incentives and weigh the long-run 
implications of their decisions. The results imply that the reform is particularly 
attractive for already strong producers. Strong producers may need a lower investment 
in order to comply with institutional requirements of the reform, and it is also easier 
for them to decide on a substantial investment with uncertain returns. Weaker 
producers, then, stay behind and will likely fade away by default in the long run.  
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This implies that despite the fact that the reform was planned to be in effect 
for a limited number of years, the desired structural change in the family-farm milk 
production sector will take much longer, essentially as long as the current generation 
of producers is around. This implies that the authorities should enable producers at 
least to sell their production quotas even after the expiration of the reform. Perhaps 
the incentives to give up the quotas should be improved, at least for the smallest 
producers, in order to speed the process. 
Another implication that comes out of this research is that intergenerational 
succession is an extremely important element of decision making in farm households, 
and the response of these households to changes in the economic environment cannot 
be disentangled from the occupational decisions of their offspring. Elderly farmers 
without a successor value the farm as a life style more than a source of income, and 
being too old for starting a new career, will likely keep producing even under much 
less favorable conditions. 
This research can be extended in several ways. More recent data on the 
implementation of the reform can be collected. This will also allow the analysis of a 
diffusion process which differentiates between producers that adopt early and those 
that adopt late. In addition, it might be possible to obtain data on the actual 
investments made by milk producers, which will provide a more precise picture on the 
steps that producers make during the gradual adoption process. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of adoption and implementation 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Limited sample Full sample  
___________________ ________________ 
Range Mean Range Mean Variable 
_______________________________________________________________ 
28-93 59.89 22-94 59.65 Age 
1-20 5.53 1-20 5.56 Household size 
0-1 0.29 0-1 0.26 Professional training 
0-1 0.46 0-1 0.44 Additional employment 
0-1 0.47 0-1 0.47 Definite successor 
0-1 0.34 0-1 0.33 Potential successor 
0-1 0.22 0-1 0.21 Partnership 
0-7.6 3.14 0-8 3.08 Production (105 liters) 
0-1 0.17 0-1 0.17 Missing production 
0-1 0.88 0-1 0.89 Self-producing 
2.49-3.48 3.11   Protein (%) 
2.46-3.88 3.27   Fat (%) 
1.19-13.79 4.53   Somatic Cell Count (105/ml) 
2-28 5.25 2-30 5.35 Years since last investment 
0-1 0.51 0-1 0.53 Cooperative society 
0-1 0.21 0-1 0.20 Producers’ cooperation 
0-1 0.48 0-1 0.41 Feed enterprise 
0-1 0.79 0-1 0.79 Central sewer 
0-1 0.40 0-1 0.41 Central region 
0-1 0.16 0-1 0.18 Southern region 
0-1 0.67 0-1 0.65 Adoption of reform 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2. Probit Results of Adoption of the Reform: Full Sample 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Marginal 
effect 
P-value T-valueStandard 
error 
CoefficientVariable 
____________________________________________________________________
 0.101 1.638 0.409 0.670 Intercept 
-0.70% 0.000 -4.4340.004 -0.019 Age 
0.10% 0.888 0.140 0.019 0.003 Household size 
3.10% 0.438 0.776 0.111 0.086 Professional training 
-2.50% 0.477 -0.7120.100 -0.071 Additional employment 
31.00% 0.000 6.409 0.133 0.855 Definite successor 
14.30% 0.004 2.861 0.127 0.364 Potential successor 
16.90% 0.020 2.321 0.222 0.515 Partnership 
5.40% 0.004 2.902 0.052 0.152 Production 
7.60% 0.462 0.736 0.294 0.216 Missing production 
-0.90% 0.885 -0.1450.164 -0.024 Self-producing 
-0.70% 0.072 -1.7980.011 -0.020 Years since last investment 
-2.00% 0.600 -0.5250.105 -0.055 Cooperative society 
12.80% 0.003 2.938 0.130 0.382 Producers’ cooperation 
-0.90% 0.806 -0.2460.109 -0.027 Feed enterprise 
-1.70% 0.712 -0.3690.127 -0.047 Central sewer 
-4.60% 0.282 -1.0750.119 -0.128 Central region 
-14.60% 0.007 -2.6830.146 -0.391 Southern region 
    891 Number of observations 
    11.43% Pseudo-R2 (Estrella 1998) 
    68.8 % correct predictions 
    103.25 Likelihood ratio statistic 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3. Probit Results of Adoption of the Reform: Limited sample 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Marginal 
effect 
P-value T-valueStandard 
error 
CoefficientVariable 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 0.484 0.700 2.409 1.685 Intercept 
-0.60% 0.001 -3.328 0.005 -0.018 Age 
1.10% 0.191 1.308 0.024 0.032 Household size 
0.50% 0.933 0.084 0.130 0.011 Professional training 
-1.80% 0.675 -0.420 0.122 -0.051 Additional employment 
30.50% 0.000 5.146 0.167 0.860 Definite successor 
10.00% 0.107 1.614 0.157 0.253 Potential successor 
20.50% 0.024 2.253 0.289 0.650 Partnership 
2.50% 0.290 0.564 0.065 0.069 Production 
-7.90% -0.578 0.374 0.065 -0.216 Missing production 
-7.10% 0.307 -1.022 0.207 -0.212 Self-producing 
-31.60% 0.251 -1.147 0.762 -0.874 Protein 
26.60% 0.031 2.154 0.344 0.741 Fat 
-2.20% 0.046 -1.994 0.032 -0.063 Somatic cells 
-1.00% 0.047 -1.990 0.014 -0.027 Years since last investment 
-9.20% 0.051 -1.954 0.132 -0.257 Cooperative society 
13.20% 0.010 2.580 0.155 0.399 Producers’ cooperation 
-3.70% 0.410 -0.824 0.127 -0.105 Feed enterprise 
-3.50% 0.523 -0.639 0.157 -0.100 Central sewer 
3.20% 0.557 0.587 0.148 0.087 Central region 
-4.70% 0.491 -0.690 0.187 -0.129 Southern region 
    616 Number of observations 
    11.37% Pseudo-R2 (Estrella 1998) 
    73.2% % correct predictions 
    70.91 Likelihood ratio statistic 
_____________________________________________________________________
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Table 4. Ordered Probit Results of Adoption and/or Implementation of the Reform: 
Full Sample 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
P-value χ2 
Statistic
Standard 
error 
CoefficientVariable 
____________________________________________________________ 
0.000 32.436 0.354 -2.016 Intercept No. 1 
0.000 25.406 0.353 -1.780 Intercept No. 2 
0.002 9.654 0.351 -1.091 Intercept No. 3 
0.000 15.765 0.004 -0.015 Age 
0.873 0.026 0.016 0.003 Household size 
0.763 0.091 0.094 0.028 Professional training 
0.949 0.004 0.084 -0.005 Additional employment 
0.000 44.143 0.116 0.771 Definite successor 
0.004 8.284 0.112 0.324 Potential successor 
0.000 15.791 0.193 0.768 Partnership 
0.000 15.919 0.044 0.176 Production 
0.238 1.395 0.253 0.299 Missing production 
0.607 0.265 0.141 -0.072 Self-producing 
0.018 5.596 0.009 -0.022 Years since last investment 
0.758 0.095 0.090 -0.028 Cooperative society 
0.023 5.132 0.108 0.244 Producers’ cooperation 
0.573 0.318 0.093 0.052 Feed enterprise 
0.942 0.005 0.109 0.008 Central sewer 
0.104 2.637 0.101 -0.164 Central region 
0.000 19.078 0.127 -0.556 Southern region 
   891 Number of observations 
   15.6% Pseudo-R2 (Estrella 1998) 
   48.1 % correct predictions 
   146.01 χ2  statistic of model fit 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5. Ordered Probit Results with Milk Quality Variables: Limited Sample 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
P-value χ2 
Statistic
Standard 
error 
CoefficientVariable 
_____________________________________________________________ 
0.222 1.490 2.042 -2.492 Intercept No. 1 
0.265 1.244 2.041 -2.277 Intercept No. 2 
0.443 0.589 2.041 -1.566 Intercept No. 3 
0.001 11.581 0.005 -0.016 Age 
0.189 1.724 0.200 0.027 Household size 
0.955 0.003 0.110 0.006 Professional training 
0.690 0.159 0.102 -0.041 Additional employment 
0.000 32.917 0.143 0.823 Definite successor 
0.131 2.280 0.136 0.205 Potential successor 
0.001 10.961 0.234 0.776 Partnership 
0.017 5.652 0.054 0.129 Production 
0.713 0.135 0.308 0.113 Missing production 
0.309 1.034 0.172 -0.175 Self-producing 
0.238 1.390 0.660 -0.779 Protein 
0.016 5.755 0.295 0.708 Fat 
0.020 5.385 0.027 -0.063 Somatic cells 
0.008 7.141 0.012 -0.031 Years since last investment 
0.156 2.013 0.111 -0.158 Cooperative society 
0.050 3.844 0.127 0.250 Producers’ cooperation 
0.863 0.030 0.108 0.019 Feed enterprise 
0.926 0.009 0.131 0.012 Central sewer 
0.782 0.077 0.125 -0.035 Central region 
0.025 4.995 0.161 -0.359 Southern region 
   616 Number of observations 
   16.50% Pseudo-R2 (Estrella 1998) 
   48.8 % correct predictions 
   107.15 χ2  statistic of model fit 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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